Philosophy: books and discussion

[Sparrow]

Originally Posted by TGS

But if that's all they are how will that stop puppy chucking? So long as I've considered the impact of my action on the puppy (presumably it's not the Hell's Angels we're talking about here), then I seem to have met my obligation, and discharged my moral responsibility. Is whether or not I go on to chuck the puppy not important?

If you understand the consequences of your action, it is less likely you will harm others - because it will make you feel guilty and unhappy to do so (generally speaking).
Also, if you throw the puppy in the full knowledge of what you're doing, I don't see how you could then object on moral grounds to someone throwing you about. It's a behaviour you are demonstrating is acceptable to you.

[TGS]

Originally Posted by Sparrow

If you understand the consequences of your action, it is less likely you will harm others - because it will make you feel guilty and unhappy to do so (generally speaking).

So the moral constraint arises from wanting to avoid feeling guilty.

Originally Posted by Sparrow

Also, if you throw the puppy in the full knowledge of what you're doing, I don't see how you could then object on moral grounds to someone throwing you about. It's a behaviour you are demonstrating is acceptable to you.

And from doing unto others as I would have them do unto me, (except that I am not a puppy, so there would need to be another step in the argument to get from me throwing a puppy to someone justifying on that ground throwing me).

Is there not any sense in which puppy throwing is just plain wrong, regardless of whether anyone knows about it, (so I am not at risk of being thrown about), and I don't feel guilty or in some other way bad when I do it?

[Sparrow]

Originally Posted by TGS

So the moral constraint arises from wanting to avoid feeling guilty.

I think there has to be a 'selfish' basis to it, I can't see how it would work otherwise.

Originally Posted by TGS

And from doing unto others as I would have them do unto me, (except that I am not a puppy, so there would need to be another step in the argument to get from me throwing a puppy to someone justifying on that ground throwing me).

Why another step, a puppy is as much of an other to you as I am?

Originally Posted by TGS

Is there not any sense in which puppy throwing is just plain wrong, regardless of whether anyone knows about it, (so I am not at risk of being thrown about), and I don't feel guilty or in some other way bad when I do it?

Not as far as I can see; but I'm open to persuasion.

[troymc]

Originally Posted by TGS

Let's use your example - once the kid "knows" that stepping on ants causes them, the ants, to feel pain the kid has a moral responsibility to...
not deliberately step on ants?
take care not to accidentally step on ants?
make adjustments to their life so as to virtually guarantee that they will not step on ants?

There are two separate issues here. In my mind the important part is that the child has learned that this question is a moral question. How he/she responds to it depends on the values he/she was raised with.

I think it's invalid then to take that next step of specifying what now is expected of them because of that. eg. I would not consider the Dalai Lama immoral or bad for not following the Jain tradition of carrying a broom to sweep small creatures from his path. He values all life and desires to remove all suffering - he just doesn't take it to the extremes that the Jains do. And Buddhists themselves are much more conscientious about not causing harm than the average person.


Troy

[TGS]

Originally Posted by Sparrow

Why another step, a puppy is as much of an other to you as I am?

Is it? There are some "other" things in the world that I perhaps don't feel guilty about throwing - a rock, a banana, a spider, a snail...- and other things that I would feel guilty about throwing - a baby, a puppy, a fish... How do we work out which things are in the throwable group and which things are in the unthrowable group?

Originally Posted by Sparrow

Not as far as I can see; but I'm open to persuasion.

Originally Posted by troymc

There are two separate issues here. In my mind the important part is that the child has learned that this question is a moral question. How he/she responds to it depends on the values he/she was raised with.

Is it a moral question because the ants can experience pain?

Originally Posted by troymc

I think it's invalid then to take that next step of specifying what now is expected of them because of that. eg. I would not consider the Dalai Lama immoral or bad for not following the Jain tradition of carrying a broom to sweep small creatures from his path. He values all life and desires to remove all suffering - he just doesn't take it to the extremes that the Jains do. And Buddhists themselves are much more conscientious about not causing harm than the average person.

If ants are not to be stepped upon, which on one interpretation means something like in an ideal world no ant should ever be stepped upon, I'm not sure I understand how it is invalid to then ask what, given that we do not live in an ideal world, can be expected of someone who knows that ants should not be stepped upon in order to avoid stepping on them.

[Sparrow]

Originally Posted by TGS

Is it? There are some "other" things in the world that I perhaps don't feel guilty about throwing - a rock, a banana, a spider, a snail...- and other things that I would feel guilty about throwing - a baby, a puppy, a fish... How do we work out which things are in the throwable group and which things are in the unthrowable group?

We could ask ourselves - do I think this other thing minds if I treat it this way?
We take into consideration their feelings (as best we can), in the same way we would want our feelings taken into consideration if we were on the receiving end.

[troymc]

Originally Posted by TGS

Is it a moral question because the ants can experience pain?

No, it's a moral question because of the underlying value of life involved. No matter how little or how much you value that life, it's the fact that there is a value at all which makes it a moral question.

Originally Posted by TGS

If ants are not to be stepped upon, which on one interpretation means something like in an ideal world no ant should ever be stepped upon, I'm not sure I understand how it is invalid to then ask what, given that we do not live in an ideal world, can be expected of someone who knows that ants should not be stepped upon in order to avoid stepping on them.

As per my prior example:
* Jains go to great length to avoid harming any creatures - including carrying a small broom to sweep their path to avoid stepping on ants.

* Buddhists value all life, and try to avoid causing any suffering - but don't go to the lengths which the Jains do.

* I am not a Buddhist - but I avoid unnecessary killing. I will carry a cricket outside instead of killing it; open a window to let out a fly instead of reaching for a flyswatter. But I don't even go to the lengths which the Buddhists do. I have not felt any major twinges of guilt when cleaning my windshield.

* and there are people who drive around running over turtles, squirrels & armadillos for fun and still consider themselves "good" people.

It's invalid because there is no single, "right" answer to that question. There is no direct relation between an action being "moral", and the "morality" of that act. Its morality is purely based on the values of the actor - or of the viewer.

The "stepping on ants" example really boils down to "what is the morality of killing?" which is based on the value of life *and* your ethical horizon - both of which can vary based on culture, up-bringing, etc.


Troy

[WT Sharpe]

Originally Posted by troymc

...I am not a Buddhist - but I avoid unnecessary killing. I will carry a cricket outside instead of killing it; open a window to let out a fly instead of reaching for a flyswatter. But I don't even go to the lengths which the Buddhists do. I have not felt any major twinges of guilt when cleaning my windshield...

I will carry insects out of the house if possible, and save them from drowning when I find them in the pool, but I have no qualms about killing a biting insect. If they don't harm me, I try to protect them when I can, but like you, I don't go to the extremes that Buddhists or Jains do. But I do respect their efforts. If it's an insect that only stings in self-defense, I will try to help them also if I come upon them in distress. I don't believe in killing for the sake of killing. Peter Singer has raised some good arguments for not eating meat, and I have tried to cut down on my consumption, but I don't think humans do as well when they abstain from meat altogether. That being said, I think we have a responsibility to ensure that animals raised for consumption are treated humanely as possible.

[TGS]

This is really interesting -so far two sorts of features seem to warrant embracing things in our moral purview; one feature is that the thing in question should have feelings and the other is that it should have life. Of course, the immediate questions are what is it to have feelings - can single celled organisms have feelings, how about plants, computers? And what is it to have "life" - does a thing have to be made out of a certain sort of stuff, is the "life stuff" of an apple different from the "life stuff" of an armadillo, and what is life stuff anyway?

Any offers?

[WT Sharpe]

The opinion of Peter Singer is that the ability to experience pain is tantamount. Hence, in his philosophy, abortions that are performed prior to conscious awareness is no breech of ethics. For one who believes that all life is either sacred or otherwise worthy in itself of moral consideration simply because it is life, abortion of a pregnancy at any stage must not be something done lightly, if their position is to be consistent. (I'm not trying to make this a debate on abortion; I only use the example for sake of illustration.) The latter position opens another whole can of worms. Since the dividing line between animal and vegetable life is blurred at the boundaries, should we not walk on grass? Should we apologize to our garden when we neglect to water it? Even the dividing line between life and non-life is not always easily determined. What consideration must be given in these cases? Bacteria are clearly living organisms, but are viruses? What of people in a vegetative state whose bodily functions are only being maintained via external mechanical means?

[Ea]

Originally Posted by WT Sharpe

I will carry insects out of the house if possible, and save them from drowning when I find them in the pool, but I have no qualms about killing a biting insect. If they don't harm me, I try to protect them when I can, but like you, I don't go to the extremes that Buddhists or Jains do. But I do respect their efforts. If it's an insect that only stings in self-defense, I will try to help them also if I come upon them in distress. I don't believe in killing for the sake of killing. Peter Singer has raised some good arguments for not eating meat, and I have tried to cut down on my consumption, but I don't think humans do as well when they abstain from meat altogether. That being said, I think we have a responsibility to ensure that animals raised for consumption are treated humanely as possible.

Bolding mine.

Sometimes I get a little tired of that term; 'treated humanely'. What does it mean? Treated like a human? Is that really better? What if we treated a cow, 'cowly', a dog, 'dogly', and a swine 'swinely' - and who should decide what was what?

In any case, I would probably be most concerned about the quality of the food that the animal provide me. I see humans as another animal among others and I don't think humans necessarily have greater (or lesser for that matter) 'moral responsibility' towards other species just because we are able to think abstractly.

[TGS]

Originally Posted by Ea

Bolding mine.

Sometimes I get a little tired of that term; 'treated humanely'. What does it mean? Treated like a human? Is that really better? What if we treated a cow, 'cowly', a dog, 'dogly', and a swine 'swinely' - and who should decide what was what?

In any case, I would probably be most concerned about the quality of the food that the animal provide me. I see humans as another animal among others and I don't think humans necessarily have greater (or lesser for that matter) 'moral responsibility' towards other species just because we are able to think abstractly.

I think maybe Ea's got a point there in the sense that if you have bred an animal solely to slaughter it then maybe whether you give it a bit of grass to run about on or keep it in a shed is morally marginal compared with the broader issue of breeding something just to kill it.

[Ea]

Originally Posted by WT Sharpe

The opinion of Peter Singer is that the ability to experience pain is tantamount. Hence, in his philosophy, abortions that are performed prior to conscious awareness is no breech of ethics. For one who believes that all life is either sacred or otherwise worthy in itself of moral consideration simply because it is life, abortion of a pregnancy at any stage must not be something done lightly, if their position is to be consistent. (I'm not trying to make this a debate on abortion; I only use the example for sake of illustration.) The latter position opens another whole can of worms. Since the dividing line between animal and vegetable life is blurred at the boundaries, should we not walk on grass? Should we apologize to our garden when we neglect to water it? Even the dividing line between life and non-life is not always easily determined. What consideration must be given in these cases? Bacteria are clearly living organisms, but are viruses? What of people in a vegetative state whose bodily functions are only being maintained via external mechanical means?

Without going into a long explanation I think I tend to take a sort of "darwinist" view. All life is of equal worth, and it's (including us) all competing for space. Killing an animal of a higher order is not inherently or essentially worse than killing a plant or animal of the lower orders. Why is the pain of an animal 'worse' (i.e. more important) than that of a plant? Logically it doesn't make sense.

[Ea]

Originally Posted by TGS

I think maybe Ea's got a point there in the sense that if you have bred an animal solely to slaughter it then maybe whether you give it a bit of grass to run about on or keep it in a shed is morally marginal compared with the broader issue of breeding something just to kill it.

My point was - I think - who's to decide what 'treated humanely' means. Many people tend to anthropophormise* animals that are close to humans and tend to think that what humans like, animals would like.

* I hope this is a word in english...

[TGS]

Originally Posted by Ea

Without going into a long explanation I think I tend to take a sort of "darwinist" view. All life is of equal worth, and it's (including us) all competing for space. Killing an animal of a higher order is not inherently or essentially worse than killing a plant or animal of the lower orders. Why is the pain of an animal 'worse' (i.e. more important) than that of a plant? Logically it doesn't make sense.

So for you it's the fact of a thing being a living thing that's important, rather than it's capacity to suffer?