Philosophy: books and discussion

[WT Sharpe]

Originally Posted by TGS

Does that mean that non-human animals are capable of moral - and immoral - action?

My personal belief is that animals that are intelligent have the potential in varying degrees for moral actions. I would include at the least animals from dogs to apes in that assessment, but it's not something I can prove.

[WT Sharpe]

Originally Posted by TimMason

There's no tautology involved. By natural morality I am referring to the idea that has been expressed here that it is possible to found morality on scientific principles, taking account of evolutionary imperatives. No god there, for the moment. But if you then show that there is a great variety of modes of evolutionary success, many of which you would *not* consider moral, then you need something that guarantees your choice of the one, or the ones, that you lean on to create your 'natural morality'. That is move 2 in the argument. Still no tautology, but we see a god appearing. That something cannot but be transcendental: ergo, you need god. If you are going to argue for a morality based on nature.



I need make no such demonstration. I have, to my own great satisfaction, demonstrated that you cannot have a natural morality without god. If I have - as you argue - only humans with human thoughts and beliefs, then that's what I have. Neither god, nor any concept of natural morality are of any help to us. We need to found our ethical principles elsewhere. If we feel the need for ethical principles. (Clearly not all of us do).

Hobbes saw that in nature there is no such thing as Right and Wrong: men will defend their own interests and are quite right to do so. However, life will not be much fun. So as to bring some order into life, Hobbes looks to something artificial: the state. Morality is a construct, enforced by law and the sword.

I think that that is about right. The story of how state institutions developed, bringing with them the moral forms that we today consider self-evident, is a long and difficult one. In many ways, the ethical principles of pre-state groups seem far more attractive than do those of Leviathan (and some of Leviathan's progeny are extremely vile). But, as I've said before, I doubt very much that many of us would like to live in Zomia.

Are you saying that for Hobbes the State is that transcendental something needed for morality; a God-substitute?

[TimMason]

Are you saying that for Hobbes the State is that transcendental something needed for morality; a God-substitute?

It seems possible.

[TimMason]

Sorry - it's much smaller than that on the original Wikipedia page.

[kennyc]

Originally Posted by TGS

Does that mean that non-human animals are capable of moral - and immoral - action?

Yes, to some extend, depending on the level of detail --- same goes for consciousness/self-awareness...

[TGS]

Originally Posted by TimMason

There's no tautology involved. By natural morality I am referring to the idea that has been expressed here that it is possible to found morality on scientific principles, taking account of evolutionary imperatives. No god there, for the moment. But if you then show that there is a great variety of modes of evolutionary success, many of which you would *not* consider moral, then you need something that guarantees your choice of the one, or the ones, that you lean on to create your 'natural morality'. That is move 2 in the argument. Still no tautology, but we see a god appearing. That something cannot but be transcendental: ergo, you need god. If you are going to argue for a morality based on nature.

I think I see the logic of your argument, but I am still not sure that there isn't a slightly more hidden tautology in there. You still seem to be, by definition, understanding "natural" to imply something beyond the experience and actions of humans. You claim that in order to have any claim on naturalism an ethics is required to rely on such a claim. Without relying on such a claim there is nothing to warrant one course of action as against another. And yet, much in the manner of G E Moore in another context, I can demonstrate that this is wrong in the following way: I place no reliance on a transcendental guarantor and yet I find myself able to make moral choices, evaluate my actions, and the actions of others, with respect to their moral value, and seem to be able to distinguish, sometimes, between those actions which have a moral value - either positive of negative - from those that do not. I do not think I am unique in having this ability nor in not requiring a transcendental guarantor. I sometimes find that conspecifics reach different judgments on the moral status of my or others actions, and then sometimes I enter into discourse with them and sometimes am able to persuade them - without relying on a transcendental guarantor - that my judgment is, in any of a variety of ways, better than theirs. Sometimes the opposite happens and I am convinced that their judgment is better. I would call this a naturalistic process in that it relies on general cognitive abilities that I and my discourse partners possess.

[FlorenceArt]

Originally Posted by TimMason

This said, there clearly exists something that we can describe as 'morality' or 'talk about morality' or, despite what Sparrow says, morally motivated behaviour. Moreover, all this talk and much of this behaviour does have real-world effects. The modern state, its laws, its protections, are all in part shaped by moral concerns. It is because the church set out to curb the excesses of the medieval feudal lords that we today have societies in which the blood-feud is a thing of the past, and in which infanticide is far more rare. It is because the state - at least in some places - was *moralized* that we live longer,healthier lives.

Are you sure that the Church ever did that? You'll need some serious proof to convince me

[TimMason]

Are you sure that the Church ever did that? You'll need some serious proof to convince me

Well, I don't know what you'll accept as serious proof. What about 'The Peace of God'?

[TimMason]

I place no reliance on a transcendental guarantor and yet I find myself able to make moral choices, evaluate my actions, and the actions of others, with respect to their moral value, and seem to be able to distinguish, sometimes, between those actions which have a moral value - either positive of negative - from those that do not.

I'm sure you do: most of us, most of the time, do not enquire as to the philosophical roots of whatever we do or whatever we think. Just as I earlier argued that scientists do not - and do not need to - obsess about the philosophical underpinnings of their day-to-day activities, so moral actors do not - and do not need to - spend much time in ethical quandary. I certainly do not - and, indeed, despite my amateur attempts at philosophical discussion in this place, have little faith in my ability to form a technically sound basis without professional help.

As Moore argued against a naturalistic ethics, I take it you are not calling him as a witness for the defence on that point, but rather invoking his 'this is a hand' argument against scepticism - an English gentlemanly common-sensical response to the wily deviousness of continental skepticism. Well, I think the skeptics riposte still holds: you cannot refute my point by waving your hands in the air. You simply put the argument to one side, consigning it to a convenient pocket while you get on with the business of life.

Your ethical common sense is, I fear, rather like the cartoon dog who, having overshot the lip of the cliff, keeps running. Post-Christian ethics, in so far as it sidesteps the objections of Sade and Dostoevsky, is running on empty. Thus it is that many of the 'new atheist' theorists are unable to see quite how difficult their position is: AC Grayling is a case in point. They seem to believe that they can have the Christian ethic without the Christianity. I'm not convinced that you can.

Let me take up another thread: I will deny that animals can have anything like a morality. This is because I conceive of morality - or ethics - as conversational, and dogs do not have conversations. (They may exchange information, but they do not converse).

At this point, we are at something of a lull in the conversation. One of the major partners - those whose ethical arguments are informed by their belief in god - has, over a short period of some one or two hundred years, been forced to concede huge stretches of terrain. He's not yet out of it; he makes rallies of some vigour from time to time. But he's no longer what he was.

But he has left many of his pieces on the table. We still use them, from time to time - perhaps most of the time - but they can no longer have the weight and power that they used to have. Sometimes one of the newer players chips in a piece which s/he feels to have fashioned from her or his own material. And other players stamp their boots.

[TimMason]

I'm sorry - I'll be away tomorrow, and perhaps the next day, so I won't be able to reply to your further objections, or admit defeat or whatever it is that I should be doing.

[Sparrow]

Originally Posted by TimMason

Let me take up another thread: I will deny that animals can have anything like a morality. This is because I conceive of morality - or ethics - as conversational, and dogs do not have conversations. (They may exchange information, but they do not converse).

But for people who don't conceive morality as conversational, the question of other species is still up for discussion.

What's niggling me is that we haven't pinned down what ethics/morality actually is - it seems to have been shape shifting throughout this thread. Or, more likely, I just haven't understood what's been going on.
I don't find notions of morality relating to human wellbeing very satisfactory - too parochial and ultimately self-referential imho. If that's all it is, what's the big deal?
At the moment I'm clinging to my view that humans aren't ethical creatures (unless it suits them) - but it's an opinion that's teetering on the traditonal views of objective good and evil as a basis for morality.

[FlorenceArt]

Originally Posted by TimMason

Well, I don't know what you'll accept as serious proof. What about 'The Peace of God'?

OK, you convinced me that there was a movement where the Church tried to defend itself and its belongings from the abuses of warring minor nobility in a troubled era.

I skimmed the French version of this article, which seems much more documented than the English one, and is at least longer (does that prove anything? Mm, probably not. But I like the French version better )

This is not a story of the progress of civilization against barbarism. It's the story of a political crisis where the failure of central government encourages minor nobles to take what they can, creating bloody local conflicts that were destructive, among other things, to the Church. Who reacts by using its moral influence to dissuade nobles to bring the pillage and destruction to its lands, by threatening them with anathema.

Here is a small excerpt from the French article (badly translated with Google's help):

This is therefore not a universal peace, an anachronistic notion, but a movement to protect church property. There is no intention to regulate the rules of war, to impose a general ban on plunder in private wars, nor to protect peasants from harm by hordes of uncontrolled militia.

For example, at the council of Limoges in 1031, the decisions only concern the rights of the Church and there is no mention of public order. In Vienne, there is no attempt to prohibit private wars, but only to limit its effects to those only who are involved (ie the "gens de guerre", or warriors). In particular, the Ppeace of God does not limit the war between princes, and the oath of Verdun-sur-le-Doubs (circa 1020) discusses the need to besiege illegal castles with the king, the count or Bishop, authorizing the drafting of villains for this type of action. This strengthens the authority of the lieges on their vassals.

I doubt very much that the Church's action in this episode had any long-term effect on feudalism, except maybe that it helped restore some level of control of higher echelons on the lower nobility.

Sorry for this historical interlude, folks

[WT Sharpe]

Originally Posted by TimMason

... Let me take up another thread: I will deny that animals can have anything like a morality. This is because I conceive of morality - or ethics - as conversational, and dogs do not have conversations. (They may exchange information, but they do not converse). ...

It's extremely unlikely that non-human animals have the capacity to argue over whether consequentialist systems of ethics are superior to deontological systems or vice versa, but I do believe the higher animals possess a sense of right and wrong behavior, and that's all that's required for a rudimentary sense of morality; hence the shame on the face of a well-trained dog who has peed in the house because no one was there to let him out at the appropriate time. It's true that this statement leaves me open to the charge of anthropomorphism, but I would counter that it's more in line with our ability to empathize with other creatures who evolved in a manner not too dissimilar from our own than those who would make the charge are willing to concede. To be certain, we must be extremely careful when attempting to discern the motivations of non-human animals, but it's no more impossible to do so in my opinion than it is impossible to discern the motivations of other humans.

Originally Posted by TimMason

I'm sorry - I'll be away tomorrow, and perhaps the next day, so I won't be able to reply to your further objections, or admit defeat or whatever it is that I should be doing.

We'll keep your chair warm for ya'! Hope that whatever is calling you away is something pleasurable.

[TGS]

Originally Posted by Sparrow

What's niggling me is that we haven't pinned down what ethics/morality actually is - it seems to have been shape shifting throughout this thread.

That's a very good point and I think part of the "dispute" of the thread relates to just that.

Here's a quote from SEP:

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximise well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as "Do unto others as you would be done by" and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

It seems to me that there has been a fair amount of talking at cross-purposes simply because different people have implicitly adopted one or other of these positions and someone else responded from a different position, and neither have been explicit about the position they are coming from.

[troymc]

Originally Posted by TimMason

Sorry for this historical interlude, folks

Personally, I quite enjoyed it!

And I think I came away from it with a similar view point to yours. The Peace of God was simply the Church's way of protecting its clergy, property & supporters in a time of near chaos. It had nothing to do with righting social/moral wrongs.

However, if that's what was meant by "curb the excesses" then I would guess it at least goes to support the initial clause of his proposition:

It is because the church set out to curb the excesses of the medieval feudal lords that we today have societies in which the blood-feud is a thing of the past

However, I think he might have a tougher time proving it as a causative agent as implied by the second part.


Troy