Quote:
Originally Posted by rcentros
I thought Walmart had a decent market share in paper books...
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Ten years ago they did.
They and Target had a great big price war with Amazon on new releases in Nov 2009.
More recently most WalMarts have gotten out of new releases and the super WalMarts I go to barely carry any books. Maybe six linear feet.
Things might be different elsewhere but the last nunbers I saw several years back were reporting massive drops in dept store sales. Into non-chain territory, well under 5% combined share.
That's one reason I never expected much to come out of that deal.
Books were once considered traffic generators in dept stores.
In fact, Manhattan publishers big war over discounting (lrading to tge first sale doctrine) was with the big dept stores in NY. Macys and the like. But tbat was 1910.
Dept stores were still significant until the 2009 price war but afterwards, once the numbers came in, most scaled back. Even $9 new releases failed to increase foot traffic. And $9 books were loss leaders. At full retail the profits didn't justify the floor space for most. Some tried ereaders, some tried tablets. These days it's mostly cheap LCD TVs, laptops, and all-in-one desktop packages in the greatly expanded dletronics section.
Look at B&N financial reports over tbe last six years or so and one phrase that invariably shows up is "reduced foot traffic". Books no longer generate customer visits at B&M. Instead they are incidentals: people go by a bookstore (or book stand), have some time on tbeir hands, and something catches their eye.
The number of people purpusefully trolling bookstores for something to buy, anything that might catch their eye, is way down.
And about to go down even more.
If I had been Kobo, instead of partnering with WalMart, I would've cooked up a Kindle Basic class of low end reader. Lighted but low-res, designed to sell for $50-60 and partnered with Hudson news and pharmacies, maybe gas stations and convenience stores. Places were people go and used to buy paperbacks and still buy magazines. Small places where Kobo-generated revenue would be noticed by the manager.
Of course, hindsight being 20-20, that too would've tanked because of the outbreaks.
Key principle holds: Kobo partners need to notice the impact of Kobo sales on their bottom line. That was never going to happen at WalMart, where yogurt sales outpace anything Kobo can muster.