To a large extent, Amazon is replicating the old B. Dalton model as an added front-end to their online bookselling business.
Nothing prevents Ingram or Baker & Taylor from doing the same.
Or whoever buys up the back end of B&N under a hypothetical liquidation.
B&N itself could do it if they were willing to file chapter 11 reorganization to rebuild the company as a three tier retailer organized around their logistic backbone and regional warehouses.
A three tier B&N 2.0 would start with online, add maybe 50 large destination stores serving urban elites and a few hundred airport newstand-sized stores (maybe reviving the B.Dalton name) featuring new releases, local interest titles, and free next day delivery of special orders. The online and small stores would share pricing (a reason to brand them separately) while the destination stores could charge higher prices to account for their higher costs.
A really competent management team might even set up a franchise operation for the smaller storefront chain to rein in dreamers looking to start up local bookstores, providing them with training and a reliable, fast, and agile supply chain. Maybe even an entry to digital sales via a Kobo-like partnership program giving franchises kickbacks from ebook purchases via ereaders sold in-store.
Options exist.
What is needed is vision and willingness to move beyond "stock it and they will come".
DWS recently listed how WMG runs their associated stores profitably.
http://www.deanwesleysmith.com/how-t...store-in-2017/
B&M bookselling doesn't have to end in failure.