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Froide · 06-15-2015, 01:44 PM

The title of this thread is "BN What Went Wrong & When?"

Let's first address the WHEN:

What went wrong happened years ago, before BN began offering ereader-tablet hybrids. But it wasn't until BN introduced the NOOKStudy (in August 2010, which I discussed at 5:11 pm yesterday in this thread), closely followed by the NOOK Color (in 4Q2010) and then the NOOK Tablet (in 4Q2011), that evidence of salient long-held, baked-in management decision-making and cultural faults in BN's senior management team's decision-making process began manifesting themselves in painfully apparent ways to external (and some internal) stakeholders. These faults drove the company to make faux pas across multiple elements of the marketing mix - scratch that, value chain - that propelled the NOOK Division ever faster down the slippery, steepening slope of decline, with ever-increasing negative impacts.

IMO, BN, investors, and the public were all too distracted by the attractiveness and positive reception of the shiny NOOK Color and NOOK Tablet devices, which everyone from developers to reviewers to consumers (like this one) really dug, to realize the Peter Principle had set in the moment BN entered the tablet arena. BN, though a seasoned, heavyweight champion amongst B&M bookstores and a viable contender in the e-ink arena, was - despite its appealing NC and NT devices - merely a lightweight amateur in the highly competitive tablet arena, outclassed by a diverse lineup of nimbler, heavier weight, or more seasoned competitors. To complete the boxing analogy, BN's NOOK Division has, from the time it entered the tablet fray, made a flurry of moves that seem punch-drunk.

Now, WHAT WENT WRONG:

IMO, a few salient things that went wrong were the NOOK Division's:

Propensity to ignore - rather than solicit and respond effectively to - competitive and market intelligence, requests, and feedback from target stakeholders. (Examples: its boneheaded moves with NOOKStudy and Yuzu, that I posted about yesterday, and the many years the NOOK Division has ignored requests to offer more user-friendly shelves or tags, that could be saved as well as used on other devices).
Adoption of a walled garden ecosystem without first - or at least quickly thereafter - putting in place the Key Success Factors needed to cultivate its success (e.g., a large, competitively priced, and consistently growing catalog of apps that target stakeholders actually want)
Decision, despite customer complaints about both the dearth and selection of available NOOK apps, to price many NOOK apps higher than those offered by competitors and not offer, in addition, the option to choose ad-supported freebie versions (as say, Google Play does)
Making moves that alienated its target stakeholders (e.g., forcing the automatic, over-the-air 1.4.1. update to NC and NT devices in December 2011 that removed users' prior ability to install and update third-party apps on their device, and that broke root for those who'd gone that extra step to customize their device.)
Partitioning of device memory in a way that demonstrates either ignorance of and/or blatant disregard for users who desire to sideload non-NOOK content (though, to BN's credit, the company later dealt with backlash by making it possible for NT users to reconfigure their device's internal memory/storage.)
Failure to adequately train all NOOK Customer Support and NOOK Technical Support staff to deal with commonly encountered technical issues, and to ensure the support staff knew and honestly informed customers that the NOOKStudy app and e-textbooks designed for that app cannot be read on an ereader, including a NOOK.

06-15-2015, 01:44 PM	#41
Froide Wizard Posts: 1,898 Karma: 9851695 Join Date: Mar 2012 Location: Noo Yawk Device: Samsung Galaxy and Windows devices. RIP: Palm & Nook devices.	The title of this thread is "BN What Went Wrong & When?" Let's first address the WHEN: What went wrong happened *years* ago, *before* BN began offering ereader-tablet hybrids. But it wasn't until BN introduced the NOOKStudy (in August 2010, which I discussed at 5:11 pm yesterday in this thread), closely followed by the NOOK Color (in 4Q2010) and then the NOOK Tablet (in 4Q2011), that evidence of salient long-held, baked-in management decision-making and cultural faults in BN's senior management team's decision-making process began manifesting themselves in painfully apparent ways to external (and some internal) stakeholders. These faults drove the company to make faux pas across multiple elements of the marketing mix - scratch that, value chain - that propelled the NOOK Division ever faster down the slippery, steepening slope of decline, with ever-increasing negative impacts. IMO, BN, investors, and the public were all too distracted by the attractiveness and positive reception of the shiny NOOK Color and NOOK Tablet devices, which everyone from developers to reviewers to consumers (like this one) really dug, to realize the Peter Principle had set in the moment BN entered the tablet arena. BN, though a seasoned, heavyweight champion amongst B&M bookstores and a viable contender in the e-ink arena, was - despite its appealing NC and NT devices - merely a lightweight amateur in the highly competitive tablet arena, outclassed by a diverse lineup of nimbler, heavier weight, or more seasoned competitors. To complete the boxing analogy, BN's NOOK Division has, from the time it entered the tablet fray, made a flurry of moves that seem punch-drunk. Now, WHAT WENT WRONG: IMO, a few salient things that went wrong were the NOOK Division's: Propensity to ignore - rather than solicit and respond effectively to - competitive and market intelligence, requests, and feedback from target stakeholders. (Examples: its boneheaded moves with NOOKStudy and Yuzu, that I posted about yesterday, and the many years the NOOK Division has ignored requests to offer more user-friendly shelves or tags, that could be saved as well as used on other devices). Adoption of a walled garden ecosystem without first - or at least quickly thereafter - putting in place the Key Success Factors needed to cultivate its success (e.g., a large, competitively priced, and consistently growing catalog of apps that target stakeholders actually want) Decision, despite customer complaints about both the dearth and selection of available NOOK apps, to price many NOOK apps higher than those offered by competitors and not offer, in addition, the option to choose ad-supported freebie versions (as say, Google Play does) Making moves that alienated its target stakeholders (e.g., forcing the automatic, over-the-air 1.4.1. update to NC and NT devices in December 2011 that removed users' prior ability to install and update third-party apps on their device, and that broke root for those who'd gone that extra step to customize their device.) Partitioning of device memory in a way that demonstrates either ignorance of and/or blatant disregard for users who desire to sideload non-NOOK content (though, to BN's credit, the company later dealt with backlash by making it possible for NT users to reconfigure their device's internal memory/storage.) Failure to adequately train all NOOK Customer Support and NOOK Technical Support staff to deal with commonly encountered technical issues, and to ensure the support staff knew and honestly informed customers that the NOOKStudy app and e-textbooks designed for that app cannot be read on an ereader, including a NOOK. Last edited by Froide; 06-24-2015 at 04:58 AM.