Quote:
Originally Posted by Lynx-lynx
I also have Sean McMeekin's, 'July 1914 Countdown to War' .... which I will read in due course.
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Recently finished this book which describes the story of Europe’s countdown to war between 28 June 1914 and Britain’s final plunge on 4 August.
The author has researched many many papers, minutes, government documents, diaries etc to reach his conclusions which he enunciates in the Epilogue, The Question of Responsibility.
Here's a sample of his reasoning:
Spoiler:
Was Germany at war with Russia, or not? No one knew. And as Bethmann argued, the strange thing was that if she were not at war with Russia, she could hardly justify going to war with France. Falkenhayn dismissed this as twaddle, arguing that ‘the war was there after all and the question of a declaration of war on France was of no account.’ Moltke agreed: ‘The war was there, and that was that.’ Still, Bethmann would not budge. He would not allow Germany’s war with France to proceed, declared or otherwise, until he had ‘some confirmation under international law’ that she was at war with Russia. At this Moltke grew angry. The Russians had mobilised first, he reminded Bethmann; shots had been fired on the East Prussian border; ....
.... Someone then pointed out, as if in passing, that Austria had still not promised to ‘take the field with us against Russia’ – rather a large oversight. Nor had Italy, a military ally since 1882, been informed that Germany had declared war on Russia. Nor had Romania, another country with which Germany had a mutual defense alliance. When they learned this, Moltke and Falkenhayn were ‘horrified.’ Tirpitz’s lasting impression from this historic night was that Germany’s ‘political leadership has completely lost its head.’2 In one area, at least, the Germans were thinking ahead. After learning from reports at four AM and six AM that Russian troops had crossed the border into East Prussia, Bethmann was able to confirm to the kaiser, the German public (via a press communique). ....
.... The chancellor finally conceded that, if the Russians had indeed fired first, then the case was ‘clear, that means the Russians have been the first to start and I shall have the declaration of war [on Russia] handed over the frontier by the nearest General.’ One might think this was unnecessary, considering that a declaration of war had already been sent to St Petersburg. Yet Bethmann did not know whether Pourtalès had handed it to Sazonov. He needed legal proof. The argument, arcane on the surface, was fundamental. With impeccable German logic, Bethmann insisted that war could not begin unless it had been declared.
In short McMeekin puts the blame on Russia and France for their deceptive conduct in the last weeks leading up to the war. He presents information relative to their withholding of information as to their respective states of Mobilisation, and other facts, in order to benefit for their own purposes.
McMeekin further claims that Germany declared war first because it couldn't countenance the idea of going to war without actually formally declaring it.