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Originally Posted by rhadin
After 2 years, they are free to revert to the agency pricing.
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Publishers/retailers can still use agency pricing (publisher sets price, retailer gets a percentage). Random House, for example, uses agency pricing on the exact same terms as everyone else, but isn't named in the lawsuit. The illegal part is the alleged collusion.
The settlement agreement specifies that retailers can continue to use agency pricing. They can't block retailer discounts and can't offer "most favored" status, but otherwise it's the same model. The DoJ even explicitly said it doesn't want to limit business models.
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Originally Posted by rhadin
What constitutes the book line?
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I'd assume that will include all the imprints. Individual imprints don't have their own contracts with Amazon (afaik).
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Originally Posted by rhadin
How will they get Amazon to disclose the sales data?
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I'm certain Amazon is are already providing that kind of info to the publishers. They're paying publishers per sale, so basic sales figures must be included. It's the more sophisticated demographic data (e.g. zip code, age, other purchases) that Amazon will continue to withhold.
The info doesn't need to be public, either. It just has to be available for the DoJ to review, if a publisher denies discounts on the basis that "Retailer X is losing money on our products."
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Originally Posted by rhadin
What constitutes "profit"?
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Not discounting so much that there's a loss. And yes, in theory a 1¢ profit is a profit, but that would also skate very close to the line.
It's unclear how closely or proactively this will be supervised, so it could be a toothless provision.
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Originally Posted by rhadin
...they could devise some other model or change the discount terms of the wholesale model, perhaps give only a 30% discount off retail and instead increase co-op fees for physcial displays in front entrances of b&m stores.
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Again, they can keep using the agency model.
The provisions against discriminating against a retailer based on anything other than volume are still in effect. So the publishers can't offer anyone "most favored" status, but also can't really offer any one retailer significantly better deals than another.
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Originally Posted by rhadin
....There is no requirement that the publishers enter a new contract with Amazon or do so under specific terms other than no agency pricing, free to discount, profit over the line, and no most-favored clause.
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The settling publishers' hands are a bit tied. Amazon is getting what it wants, the publishers have very little leverage left, so I'm sure the dust will settle quickly.
The publishers can't afford to ditch Amazon, the backlash against them would be huge. The "nuclear option" is not an option.
In a few weeks, Amazon will be discounting lots of ebooks as heavily as they can get away with. B&N will be screwed -- if they cut prices, their margins evaporate; if they don't, their market share and sales will deteriorate.
Apple is one of the few who can afford to match Amazon. The thing is, they don't
have to match Amazon. Apple makes its revenues from hardware sales, not content sales. Their real motivation in pushing for undifferentiated ebook prices isn't to make money from ebooks, it's to stick a big fat thumb in Amazon's eye.
The other is Google, because like Apple they have a massive war chest and earn almost all of their money from search. However, that also means they don't have much incentive to compete in this space. Why throw away perfectly good money on something that people can already run searches on, when the mobile market is slipping away?
I agree there are lots of unknowns, but for the settled publishers it's minor details, that will give a clue to the nature of possible future settlements or penalties.