Quote:
Originally Posted by Andrew H.
You left out an important part of the quote:
Subparagraph C refers to the list of six exceptions adopted by the Librarian of Congress
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This is true, but as others have pointed out, there are indications that the DMCA exemptions adopted by the Librarian of Congress are not exclusive of other provisions of the law, and other provisions of the general scheme of US copyright law. There's a principle of statutory interpretation which states, in a nutshell, that when a court is interpreting a single provision of law, it should view that provision in the context of the whole body of law of which it is a part, with the aim of harmonizing all parts of the law. (Since I'm in California, see the California Supreme Court's comments in
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 131; but the rules of statutory interpretation are pretty uniform from place to place within the US).
Since the DMCA states that "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title" (17 USC 1201(c)(1)), I don't think you can pick out the anti-circumvention provision, in isolation from the rest of the statute, and say that it makes a clear statement that stripping DRM for personal use is illegal. I think a strong argument could be made that stripping DRM to re-enable access to content which you purchased and to which you lost access due to the actions of the content provider would not be a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. But I also stand behind my statement that until a court of law actually decides this issue, the real answer is "who the heck knows".