

GO WORLD

SUMMER 1984 NO.36



Tenth Kisei Title Match, Game One

*An example of Go Books You Touch
in action*

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G A M E C

An unexpected victim of Cho's accident was his opponent. The uncertainty it created put great pressure on Kobayashi and he confessed to Sakata that he was unable to sleep at night worrying about what was going to happen to the

match. He said that he thought he was going crazy. His play in the first game shows that he got the better of his nerves, but he was in a no-win position: if he won, Cho would get all the sympathy, but if he lost—well, that didn't bear thinking about.

White: Kobayashi Koichi ,
Meijin, Judan & Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun , Kisei

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each.

Played on 16, 17 January 1986.

*Commentary by Fujisawa
Shuko , Honorary Kisei.*

Fig. 1 (1–50). White starts well.




Fig. 1 (1-50)


White 10. An improvement by Kobayashi. In a previous game with Cho, he had played the kosumi, but then Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 22 had combined well with Black 3 in the figure.

Black 17 is correct strategy. If instead Black jumps to 'd', he is unable to make a counterpincer against 16.


White 22 is a good move: it forestalls Black 'b' and maintains balance. This move was followed by the luncheon recess. Kobayashi was playing at a more leisurely pace than

in last year's Meijin title match.

Black 23. Presumably Cho felt that answering **22** immediately would have been submissive. The exchange of **24–30** that follows **23** is natural.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


White 32 is correct. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 1 actually helps Black to strengthen himself. He also gets the *aji* of 'a'.

White 34. Attaching at 1 in Dia. 2 is also big. If Black resists with 2 and 4, White fights with 5. Kobayashi's 34 makes *miai* of 1 and 36 in the figure.

White 36. If omitted, Black 44 is big.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 37. Close to being the losing move. Black should push along at **1** in Dia. 3. If **2 to 5** follow, Black makes a big reduction in White's top area. He should get a chance to connect at **'a'** later, and in the meantime he has the threat of **'b'**. The thinness of White's position would also make the *aji* of **'c'** disturbing.

White 44. If he connects, Black aims at the 2-4 combination.

Black 45. The sealed move. Black seems to have no good follow-up to 43, so taking territory with 45 is reasonable (it forestalls White 'h'). If instead Black follows Dia. 4, White doesn't fight a ko but counters with 6 and 8. If Black connects at 5, White plays 6 and is untroubled. The black group could well end up being a burden to Black.

White 46. An example of Kobayashi's willingness to simplify in a difficult position. Shuko: "The

shoulder hit of 46 took me by surprise. If Kobayashi had calculated that this was enough to win, then it shows formidable self-confidence. I would probably think of entering more deeply. Of course, it's not easy to say exactly where one would play." Because Black played low with 35 (instead of on the 4th line), he could answer 'i' at 'j' and expect to kill White outright.

White 50, destroying what *aji* 43 does have, shows that White is confident he is ahead.

Fig. 2 (51–100). The endgame begins.





Fig. 2 (51–100)

White 54 is a good answer to 53. Perhaps Black should have attached at 'a', forcing White to extend at 'b', then played at 67. At this stage White is already ahead, though only by a narrow margin, and just wants to wrap up the game. Since Cho and Kobayashi are both territorial players, their clashes lack the drama of the Cho—Takemiya title match.

White 80 is yet another example of Kobayashi's readiness to eliminate *aji* when he is ahead. Shuko commented that there was no way he could play a move like this; he would want to keep open the option of

playing at 'c' or 'd'.



Dia. 5

White 88, 90. Perfectly timed. Black has to submit with 91. If at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 5, White cuts with 2 to 10. Black 95 aims at attacking White's eye-shape with Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g'. White answers correctly with 96–100.

Fig. 3 (101–150). Winding up the game.





Fig. 3 (101–150)



Dia. 6

White 2 is important. If White simply plays 1 in Dia. 6, then after 2 and 4 he cannot squeeze with 'a' and 'b', as then his five stones to the left cannot escape. Thanks to his forcing move at 90, White is able to pull out his stones with 12 and 14. This minor skirmish finishes with

White's lead intact.

Fig. 4 (151–216). Cho's indomitable spirit.




Fig. 4 (151–216)

Although he lost without putting up his usual dogged resistance, Cho did not look unhappy after this game. He had satisfied himself that he could stand up to the rigours of a two-day game and in the circumstances it was a miracle that he got so close. His performance can only be called a triumph of will-power. According to Kobayashi, Cho seemed to be in some pain on the morning of the second day, but his stamina held out. In fact, after the game finished at 7.31 p.m., he stayed up until 4 a.m. talking with Shuko and his doctor (who was in attendance on him throughout the first three games).

White wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 29 minutes. Black: 8 hours 58 minutes.

("Kido", March 1986)