For non fiction, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is
really heavy reading. It is one of these books that is more read about than actually read. Here's a link to the Random Kant Generator,
http://interconnected.org/home/more/2000/08/kant/ which generates text that has a resemblance to how work. At first glance, it looks like it might not be gibberish.
Here's a sample from the generator. (It gives you new text each time you load it)
By virtue of human reason, the manifold (and to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that this is true) has nothing to do with the thing in itself; in the case of philosophy, the Transcendental Deduction is the mere result of the power of the Ideal, a blind but indispensable function of the soul. I assert, therefore, that the transcendental aesthetic has nothing to do with the thing in itself. As any dedicated reader can clearly see, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that, in reference to ends, necessity is a body of demonstrated doctrine, and none of it must be known a priori. Our ideas are just as necessary as, then, the manifold. It must not be supposed that, then, natural causes, with the sole exception of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, have lying before them the Antinomies. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions is a representation of our understanding; for these reasons, the objects in space and time (and there can be no doubt that this is the case) are just as necessary as the phenomena. But to this matter no answer is possible.
Here's a passage from the
actual text of A Critique of Pure Reason:
Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the
Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically,
that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and
stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the
system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself
does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only
because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of
all human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a
complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the
said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions
themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from
them, it abstains with reason; partly because it would be deviating from
the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process
is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the
synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because
it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this
essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and
deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do.