Are Mormons theists?
Source: Religious Studies
Publication Date: 01-SEP-96
Author: Howsepian, A.A.

It is widely believed to be a fundamental tenet of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereafter the LDS, or Mormon, Church) that a plurality of divine beings inhabits the universe. It has often been pointed out, for example, that according to Mormon doctrine Elohim (the Father), Jesus (the Son), and the Holy Ghost are three distinct Gods.[1] The traditional Christian doctrine of the Trinity is, thereby, unambiguously rejected. In light of this, it has become commonplace among Christian apologists[2] to infer

(1) The Mormon Church is polytheistic,

from

(2) The LDS Church both appears to believe in the existence of numerous Gods and appears to worship numerous Gods.

In this essay I plan to meet the following four objectives: (i) Show that the inference from proposition (2) to proposition (1) is an invalid inference; (ii) defend proposition (2); (iii) reject proposition (1); and (iv) given the cogency of my arguments, attempt as best I can to situate Mormonism on the landscape of contemporary philosophical theology. Far from being polytheists, I shall conclude that in spite of initial appearances Mormons are, in fact, atheists.

I

Objective (i) appears quite easy to meet, for it requires no more than to show that it is possible for proposition (2) to be true while proposition (1) is false. It is an elementary truth of logic that an argument A is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible for A's conclusion to be false when A's premises are true. So, if there is some manner in which (2) could be true while (1) is false, our objective will have been met. That this is possible can easily be demonstrated in the following manner: Consider a situation in which person S appears to believe that proposition p, but does not actually believe that p. It might appear to S, for example, that Sodan actually believes that she had spent Armenian Martyrs Day 1995 with Wassie, without her really believing that she spent that day with Wassie. Sodan might, for instance, be lying about this; or, perhaps, she has recurrent vocal tics or complex partial seizures which result in her clearly enunciating, but not believing, 'I spent Armenian Martyrs Day 1995 with Wassie'.

In a similar manner, proposition (2) might be true and proposition (1) false if the LDS Church were deceiving us about how many Gods it believes exist or if what the LDS Church countenanced as Gods are not genuine Gods after all, but some other sorts of things. So, even if it were the case that both (1) and (2) were to express true propositions, (1) does not follow logically from (2), and this is all we need in order to meet our first objective.

II

Objective (ii) is also easily achievable. Joseph Smith Jr., the first President, Prophet, Seer, and Revelator of the Mormon Church promulgated theological doctrines which appear to be explicitly inconsistent with traditional Christian trinitarianism as well as any other form of monotheism. In one of the Mormon Church's four standard works[3], The Pearl of Great Price, Joseph Smith repeatedly refers to 'the Gods' as those beings who 'organized the earth' (Abraham 4: 25), 'pronounced the dry land, Earth' (Abraham 4: 10), and 'planted a garden, eastward in Eden' (Abraham 5:8). Elsewhere, Smith writes,

I wish to declare I have always and in all congregations when I have preached on the subject of the Deity, it has been the plurality of Gods. It has been preached by the Elders for fifteen years.

I have always declared God to be a distinct personage, Jesus Christ a separate and distinct personage from God the Father, and that the Holy Ghost was a distinct personage and a Spirit: and these three constitute three distinct personages and three Gods. If this is in accordance with the New Testament, lo and behold! we have three Gods anyhow, and they are plural; and who can contradict it?[4]

Brigham Young, the second President of the LDS Church, concurs, adding, 'How many Gods there are, I do not know. But there never was a time when there were no Gods.'[5]

This doctrine of the 'plurality of Gods' is part of the bedrock of orthodox Mormon theology. According to LDS theology, what is referred to as 'the Godhead' is thought to be composed of three distinct Gods, the Father (Elohim), the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Ghost. Mormons believe that the Father and the Son are embodied personages possessing physical tabernacles of flesh and bone, while the Holy Ghost is an incorporeal personage of spirit. Jesus is thought not to have been 'begotten' by the Father as that relation is understood in Christian orthodoxy, rather according to Mormon orthodoxy God the Father is thought to have literally sired the earthly Christ Jesus.[6] Furthermore, according to one prominent strand of Mormon orthodoxy, although there was no time when Christ's spirit was not[7], there was a time when Jesus was not a God. Similarly, there was a time when the Father was not a God. Rather, according to Mormonism, God the Father was once an unexalted man named Elohim who lived a righteous life on another planet that was itself the dominion of yet other Gods who themselves were also once unexalted men. Heber C. Kimball, a past member of the LDS First Presidency expressed it like this: '[O]ur Father and God... is connected with one who is still farther back; and this Father is connected with one still farther back, and so on[.]'[8]

According to LDS teaching, then, the members of what is called 'the Godhead' are the Gods of this planet, but not all of the Gods that there are; in fact, the Gods of the Godhead are not even all the Gods most intimately associated with this world, for it is also taught that God the Father has some wives and, hence, that there is at least one 'Heavenly Mother' associated with planet Earth.[9] According to Elder Bruce R. McConkie, a member of the LDS First Council of the Seventy, implicit in the Mormon

verity that all men are the spirit children of an Eternal Father is the usually unspoken truth that they are also the offspring of an Eternal Mother. An exalted and glorified Man of Holiness (Moses 6: 57) could not be a Father unless a Woman of like glory, perfection, and holiness was associated with him as a Mother.[10]

Now, although the LDS Church teaches that there exists quite a large number of Gods and Goddesses distributed throughout the universe, and (at least) four Gods intimately associated with planet Earth, only three of these (the Father, Son and Holy Ghost) are worshipped and only one of these (the Father) is an object of prayer. According to McConkie:

Three separate personages - Father, Son, and Holy Ghost - comprise the Godhead. As each of these persons is a God, it is evident, from this standpoint alone, that a plurality of Gods exists. To us, speaking in the proper infinite sense, these three are the only Gods we worship. But in addition there is an infinite number of holy personages, drawn from worlds without number, who have passed on to exaltation and are thus gods.[11]

Although several other of the over two hundred religious sects which trace their origins to Joseph Smith's teachings (the largest such non-Mormon sect being the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) reject many of the above religious teachings, the fact that the LDS Church appears to countenance the existence of a plurality of Gods is beyond rational dispute. By merely pointing this out we have therein met our second objective.

I shall next argue that in spite of the fact that the LDS Church appears to countenance the existence of numerous Gods, it is false that the Mormon Church is polytheistic. I shall define a polytheist as follows: x is a polytheist if and only if (a) x believes that at least two Gods exist and (b) x worships at least two Gods. Polytheists are to be distinguished from henotheists and monotheists as follows: x is a henotheist[12] if and only if (a) x believes that at least one God exists, (b) x does not deny the existence of more than one God, and (c) x worships one and only one God; and x is a monotheist if and only if (a) x believes that one and only one God exists and (b) x worships one and only one God.

Furthermore, let us agree to call anyone who believes in the existence of two or more Gods a doxapolytheist. Thus, polytheists are doxapolytheists. One who believes in the existence of two Gods but worships none would also be a doxapolytheist. Let us also call anyone who believes in the existence of one God and is not a doxapolytheist a doxamonotheist. Monotheists and henotheists are, therefore, doxamonotheists. One who believes in the existence of one and only one God but worships none would also be a doxamonotheist. X is a theist, then, if and only if x is either a doxapolytheist or a doxamonotheist; and x is an atheist if and only if x disbelieves in the existence of at least one God (and, hence, just in case x denies both doxamonotheism and doxapolytheism).

Note that disbelieving proposition p is a stronger doxastic attitude than merely not believing p; simply not believing in the existence of at least one God is not therefore sufficient for being an atheist. Both human neonates and brute animals, for example, do not believe in the existence of any Gods at all, but neither do they disbelieve in the existence of at least one God and, hence, it would be wholly inappropriate to label either human neonates or brute animals 'atheists.'

As we have clearly seen, Mormons do appear to believe in the existence of a plurality of Gods and, given the fact that McConkie is widely acknowledged to be speaking for the whole LDS Church on this matter, also appear to worship a plurality of Gods. But given what we have concluded concerning our first objective, we are not thereby warranted in making an inference from such an appearance to the fact of Mormon polytheism. It is obvious, we said, that one can appear to believe that p and, at the same time, actually not believe - or even disbelieve - that p. In the case of Mormonism, such a discrepancy between appearance and reality might have become manifest for at least the following two reasons: first, because Mormons have been intentionally deceptive about what their actual theological beliefs are; and second, because no entity countenanced as being a God by the LDS Church, given any plausible characterization of the concept of deity, qualifies as being a genuine God.

I shall say nothing more about the first of these alternatives. The task of expounding on the second alternative, though, shall occupy the remainder of this paper. Specifically, I shall next attempt to show both that none of the individual entities in a traditional Mormon ontology[13] qualifies as being a genuine God and that the entire collection of entities in this ontology likewise does not qualify as being a genuine God. I shall thus argue that Mormonism is neither doxapolytheistic nor doxamonotheistic. In addition, I shall simply point out the fact that the Mormon Church knowingly rejects alternative theistic systems of religion. Having accomplished these tasks, I shall conclude that, contrary to appearances, Mormonism is actually a sophisticated form of atheism.

III

According to Brigham Young, 'It appears ridiculous to the world, under their darkness and erroneous traditions, that God [the Father] has once been a finite being[.]'[14] Young implies here that God the Father had, at some previous time, been a finite being, but is no longer a finite being. Of course, on any standard understanding of finitude of being this is metaphysically impossible. That is, it is a conceptual truth that a being that is finite at any moment is finite at every moment; likewise, a being that is infinite at any moment must also be infinite at every moment. The primary reason for believing these to be conceptual truths is that there is, in theological contexts, good reason to identify an infinite being with an Anselmian perfect being, i.e. with a being than which no greater is possible.[15] The principal intuition at work here is that an infinite personal being can have no (non-logical) limitations of any sort; such a being is maximally or unsurpassably great; or, in other words, the greatest possible being.

Of course, Young might have meant something quite a bit weaker than the claim that a finite being could become infinite in this strict sense. Perhaps, for instance, Young instead had this in mind: Elohim, having once been an (unexalted) man, used to be a finite being of a certain stature. But as a result of his obedience to the laws and ordinances of his God(s), Elohim was elevated to a more exalted station of finitude[16] in virtue of being endowed with a maximally compossible set of omniproperties (if any) which it is (broadly) logically possible for a finite being to possess and any additional compossible omniproperty analogues which such an exalted finite being could possess. So, although Elohim would remain submaximally endowed (and hence finite) with respect to his noetic faculties at every time t subsequent to his exaltation and, therefore, would not be omniscient at t (in virtue, for example, of Elohim's not having de re knowledge of all actual states of affairs which occurred prior to t) he would possess all of the de dicto knowledge which an infinite (and, hence, omniscient) being would possess at t. Given this understanding of Young, God the Father is himself not an infinite being, although he does now possess all of the omniproperties (if any) and all of the omniproperty analogues that it is possible for a finite being like Elohim to possess.

But even this weaker interpretation of Young is in apparent tension both with some of Young's other theological pronouncements and with the teachings of other, more recent, authoritative LDS theologians. In the first instance, for example, Young has written that, 'We are now, or may be, as perfect in our sphere as God and Angels are in theirs, but the greatest intelligence in existence can continually ascend to greater heights of perfection.'[17] Similarly, in the second instance, according to the fourth LDS Church President, Wilford Woodruff, 'God himself is increasing and progressing in knowledge, power, and dominion, and will do so, worlds without end.'[18]

The correct manner in which to understand this Mormon 'doctrine of eternal progression' continues to be a subject of dispute. There has, however, been a gradual consensus taking form in recent LDS theology. Rather than accepting a Whiteheadian pantheon of 'Gods in process' with respect to their traditional deifying properties, the Mormon theological community appears to be moving toward a conception of the members of the Godhead as beings with all compossible omniproperties (if any) and omniproperty analogues bestowed upon them at the moment of their exaltation. What is now believed to change with time are not the Gods' intrinsic deifying properties, but their extrinsic, relational properties, specifically those properties which are a function of the manner in which the Gods are related to their 'creations'. On this view, the God and Heavenly Father of Elohim is greater than Elohim not, for instance, in virtue of knowing the truth values of any more propositions than Elohim knows, but (to a first approximation) in virtue of having dominion over a share of creation which has more being than Elohim's share of creation happens to have.[19]

At any rate, however one chooses to understand the manner in which Mormon Gods eternally progress, it is clear that within the bounds of traditional Mormon metaphysics, neither the Heavenly Father, nor the Heavenly Mother, nor Jesus the Son, nor the Holy Ghost are (individually) 'greatest possible beings'. For it is metaphysically possible, for example, both for Elohim to have been greater (i.e. more progressed) than he presently is and for there to exist beings greater than Elohim; in fact, according to traditional Mormon theology, there actually are such beings, the Father God and Grandfather God of Elohim, for example. For, according to the doctrine of eternal progression (however one chooses to understood it), Elohim's Heavenly Father has progressed to a degree of glory greater than the Son whom he organized. But if Elohim's Heavenly Father is a greater being than Elohim, and if it is a conceptual truth that God is the greatest possible (or most perfect) being, then Elohim is not a genuine God; mutatis mutandis for the remaining Gods of the Mormon Godhead. It follows then that none of the so-called Gods in the Mormon Godhead are genuine Gods. But if none of the members of the LDS Godhead are genuine Gods, and if (as McConkie has noted) Mormons worship only the members of the Godhead, then Mormons do not really worship any Gods at all. Thus, in accordance with our previous definitions, I here conclude that Mormons are neither polytheists nor henotheists nor monotheists.

IV

We must next pursue the question of whether Mormons believe in the existence of at least one God - regardless of whether or not they recognize this being to be a genuine God - and worship none. Is there anything at all in traditional Mormon ontology that qualifies for the office of Godhood? There appear to be only three plausible candidates. First, there are those numerous persons who have achieved exaltation and who are not intimately associated with planet Earth. But, again, all of those beings, like Elohim, are also eternally progressing. None is now, or ever can be, a greatest possible or infinite being.

Second, there is also what Van Hale calls 'unorganized spirit matter'[20] - that material out of which spirits are thought to have been formed[21] - in addition to pre-existent inorganic matter, in addition to other particulars (or universals if any) in traditional Mormon ontology. These are, to be sure, dark teachings, but their darkness notwithstanding they are nonetheless worthy of serious reflection. What I am offering for consideration here is any universal or particular which is an element in traditional Mormon ontology and which is a member of the complement of the set of all exalted persons. Although also believed by some Mormon thinkers to be necessarily existent, neither this material element itself, nor the unexalted individual entities formed out of this material element, nor any other being in this large subset of entities in Mormon ontology of which I am aware, whether particular or universal, is either omnibenevolent or omnipotent or omniscient or in any other sense maximally or unsurpassably great and, therefore, these too do not appear to qualify for genuine Godhood.

Third, one might wonder whether the entire collection of entities in a Mormon ontology when considered together constitutes a genuine God? I don't see how it could. For this entire collection is such that it is metaphysically possible that there be a greater such collection, since it appears to follow from the doctrine of eternal progression that for any given subset of Mormon gods, it is metaphysically possible for each member of that subset to be greater than he or she in fact is. Given this fact, the entire collection of entities purported to exist within a Mormon ontology also could not be a greatest possible being and hence could not constitute a genuine God. But if this is so, then even those Mormons who consciously view all that exists in a Mormon ontological framework as being a single God are also neither doxapolytheists nor doxamonotheists.

It is of importance to point out at this juncture, that the Mormon Church does not merely not believe in the existence of any genuine Gods, but that it in fact teaches that the Anselmian theistic alternatives as found, for example, in traditional Christianity, have been carefully considered and explicitly rejected.[22] In light of this explicit rejection of theistic religion in conjunction with the lack of Mormon ontological resources necessary for constituting even one genuine God, I provisionally conclude that Mormons are not polytheists (or even doxapolytheists) as is widely believed, but that they are in fact atheists.

V

One might justifiably charge that I have, up to this point, been moving much too quickly. Why, after all, is it not possible both to be a genuine worship-worthy deity and, contra Anselmians, to lack certain omniproperties? We will follow Clement Dore and Brian Leftow here and refer to any such lesser divine being as a 'minor deity'.[23] More precisely, according to Leftow, if we let S be a set of attributes which makes something divine, then if x is a minor deity, x exemplifies some, but not all, members of S, and letting F denote any deifying attribute, if x lacks F, it is metaphysically impossible that x have F.[24]

Leftow defends this characterization of a minor deity by utilizing a now commonly invoked strategy for characterizing divine omnipotence in which omnipotence is understood to be a property whose perfect instantiation is not impeded by the constraints of metaphysical necessity. Just as the Anselmian God is unable to do the metaphysically impossible, so too, a minor deity is also unable to do what is metaphysically impossible for it to do. Thus, according to Leftow, a minor deity, although not perfect simpliciter (as is the Anselmian God) is perfect 'of its kind' and therefore 'as perfect as it can be'.[25] Hence, states Leftow, 'necessarily, if something is a minor deity, it exemplifies all the members of S that it can'.[26]

Leftow also exploits the close connection between worship-worthiness and deity in the Western theistic tradition in his attempt to show that Christian theists for example, would, on reflection, recognize Leftowian minor deities as actual deities. According to Leftow, x is divine if and only if x is worthy of worship. Furthermore, he avers, some sub-maximally powerful (or benevolent or knowledgeable) beings are, by Western theistic standards, worship-worthy and, therefore are, by these standards, divine.[27] An hypothetical narrative of a being named Nod that is believed to qualify as a minor deity is chronicled by Leftow as follows:

Now perfect moral goodness is one attribute Western theists insist to be a member of S. Nod is at least of an awe-inspiring power and knowledge, and awe is one key response involved in worship. Only Nod's unending anguish, freely undertaken, spares the human race all manner of awfulness. Thus Passians are certainly rational in thinking themselves to owe Nod great thanks and praise. It is not clear on what basis one could deny these thanks and praise the title 'worship', particularly if the main attribute involved in their paeans is perfect goodness, and the rest of Nod's relevant attributes are (as we have said) awe-inspiringly greater than any human can conceive, and Nod is thanked for salvific actions. The thanks and praise Passians address to Nod, after all, are very much like those which Christians address to God.[28]

Leftow further asserts that for Passians 'Nod satisfies Anselm's description of God as something than which no greater can be conceived[.]'[29] But Leftow's insistence on taking quite literally Anselm's emphasis on conceivability rather than metaphysical possibility does nothing to turn back objections to Leftow's proposal which are based on contemporary construals of Anselmianism.[30] Although, historically, Anselmians have been ambiguous in their characterization of deity between, on the one hand, God as the being than which none greater can be conceived and, on the other hand, God as the metaphysically greatest possible being, contemporary Anselmians do not typically share in this ambiguity: rather, in contemporary discussions, the concept of God is typically framed independent of one's psychological powers and, instead, God is understood to be nothing less than a metaphysically unsurpassable being. But even if criteria for deity that are explicitly dependent on conceivability are retained, the Mormon's Elohim remains disanalogous to the Passian's Nod. For according to Leftow, Passians cannot conceive of a being greater than Nod, while Mormons can (and do) conceive of beings greater than Elohim.

Furthermore, although the Mormon's Elohim does exemplify some but not all members of S in fulfilment of the first of Leftow's necessary conditions for x's being a minor deity, it appears not to be the case that Elohim satisfies the second necessary condition advanced by Leftow; for it appears that it is metaphysically possible for Elohim to have been greater than he in fact is. Suppose, for example, that Elohim had been born several generations prior to when he was actually born. As far as I know, nothing either in Mormon theology or in the metaphysics of modality precludes this possibility. But if this is possible and if, in virtue of his righteousness, Elohim was exalted to Godhood n generations (where n is a whole number greater than zero) prior to the time of his exaltation in the actual world then, given the truth of the doctrine of eternal progression, Elohim would have been greater than he in fact now is. If this is so, then not even Elohim is perfect "of his kind" and, therefore, not even Elohim counts as a minor deity in accord with Leftow's criteria.

VI

I have, thus far, attempted to show that even on Leftow's construal of a minor deity, the Mormon's Elohim could not be such a deity. If there were a being b who is the most advanced intelligence in the universe, then although b would himself be the greatest Mormon 'God', it would remain metaphysically possible both for there to have been a being greater than b and for b to have been even greater than he in fact is. And if there were not, or could not be, such a preeminent Mormon deity, then for any being b in this eternally progressing infinitely populated ontology of Mormon 'Gods' there would always be a greater and, therefore, no such being could possibly be a genuine God.

So, it seems that by the lights of both traditional and contemporary (monotheistic) Anselmianism, as well as by the lights of Leftow's (polytheistic) Anselmianism, nothing countenanced by Mormon metaphysicians could possibly count as God. But then it appears that Mormons are not really theists after all. And if not theists and, in virtue of their total rejection of alternative theistic systems of religion, not mere non-theists, then it appears that Mormons are atheists; that is, of course, unless we have overlooked something. Perhaps there is some manner of adequately construing deity which has escaped us and which can comfortably accommodate the so-called Gods of traditional Mormonism. But, frankly, I see no alternate way in which this would be possible. One would not, after all, be warranted in claiming that whatever possessed some (but not all) of the properties of deity and was worshipped by a faith community must, in virtue of these properties and practices alone, be a genuine God. If this were so, then those allegedly rebellious (pre-existent) human spirits which lost what Mormons call the 'rebellion in heaven', in virtue (on one widely held account) of their being necessarily existent beings, could, if worshipped by a faith community, also be genuine Gods. But that would be absurd.

Interestingly, Mormon writer David Yarn has warned that 'Mortals should take no special pride in the necessity of their original being ... for they share this characteristic in common with all other things which exist.'[31] Thus, according to this view, not only do we (in some sense) exist necessarily, so do the elementary particles which make up thrips, stones and horses. Now supposing that necessary being is a great-making (or deifying) property, it would then appear to follow from Leftow's criteria that, in conjunction with the fact that it is a necessary truth that impersonal elementary particles could not possibly possess any personal or other non-personal great-making attributes (if there are any other such attributes), all elementary particles within the framework of a traditional Mormon ontology are minor deities. But this too would be absurd. It appears, then, that Leftow's criteria are not at all adequate for making the divine-nondivine distinction in the context of Mormon metaphysics. But if this is so, then where is the Mormon theologian to turn?

Perhaps there are effective strategies for circumventing the objections to Mormon theism which I have advanced above. Perhaps Mormons can rightfully claim, for example, that the exemplification of genuine Godhood involves a kind of finitude of being that is characterized, at least in part, by those special (familial) relationships that are thought to obtain between exalted intelligences and their spirit children. But this proposal would not remove the heart of our puzzlement; for, although it would be quite easy to comprehend the emergence of special obligations which might obtain between exalted parents and their spirit children in this framework, it would remain very difficult indeed to make sense of the claim that being involved in the procreative and parenting processes in question somehow also has the power to transform creatures into Gods.

The general contours of the preceding discussion bring into view the following: There is, as I see it, an ineliminable arbitrariness to what counts as something's being considered to be a God within a Mormon ontological framework. In Anselmian monotheism, there is no such arbitrariness involved in virtue of the fact that the Anselmian God is both sui generis and unsurpassably great. But in Mormonism, each member of a class of beings is considered to be divine none of which is either sui generis or unsurpassably great. The question then arises: What reason is there to think that only beings in that class are genuine deities which deserve our worship? None that I can see. One might further ask, as I have in this essay: What reason is there to think that any beings in that class are genuine deities? Again, as I have argued above, none that I can see.

VII

The problem of Mormon atheism may be further highlighted by reflecting on the following puzzle: It appears impossible that there be faithful Mormons, for one would assume that faithful Mormons (like other persons of faith who consider themselves to be theists) are such that they would faithfully worship the Godhead; yet, even if one were to recognize the Gods of the Mormon Godhead as being genuine deities, it appears impossible for Mormons faithfully to worship their Godhead; therefore it appears that there can be no faithful Mormons.

What I am drawing attention to by having proposed this argument is the charge that the Mormon Godhead is not an adequate object of worship. There is a growing literature on this topic. (See, for example, Bergera, 1989.) Generally, the primary reasons given in support of the claim that the Mormon Godhead is not worship-worthy are that this Godhead lacks certain omniproperties, is not the ex nihilo creator of the world, is not the being(s) on which we are metaphysically dependent, etc. My reasons differ from these.

Consider the following Principle of the Fidelity of Worship (PFW): Necessarily, if G is a proper object of worship for S at some time t', then for any time t after t', if G exists at t, and if S exists at t, then G is a proper object of worship for S.

I shall next show that LDS theology is incompatible with PFW, for in Mormonism, it is possible both that there be a time t' such that S ought to worship Mormon G at t' and that there be a time t after t' such that both S and G exist at t but it not be the case that G is a proper object of worship for S. For, in Mormonism it is possible for Godhead G to be a proper object of worship for S at t', but this is not so if S himself is exalted to Godhood at some later time t, since it is clearly a necessary truth that there can be no being B such that B is a proper object of worship for God. If this is so, then it is impossible for S both properly to worship G at t' and properly to worship G at t. And if this is the case, then the relationship between Mormons and the Mormon Godhead is, in the ideal case scenario, a relationship that is essentially marred by infidelity. It is for this reason, then, that there can be no faithful Mormons: Mormons who are not exalted are not exalted because they are not in a proper worshipful faith relationship with the Godhead; and Mormons who are exalted cannot remain in such a proper worshipful faith relationship[32], for those Gods which good Mormons ought to worship at one time are Gods they ought not worship at another. But no being that is worship-worthy for S at one time could possibly lack that property (assuming that both S and that being exist) at another.

'Western theists', Leftow claims, 'hold that for all x, if [x] exemplifies all the members of S [where, again, S is a set of attributes which make something divine], then x is divine, and more importantly ... if x is divine, x deserves worship.'(33)[33] Mormonism severs this intimate connection between worship-worthiness and deity in a most personal way. What Mormon teaching allows is the endorsement of the conditional: If x is divine, x deserves worship by someone, but not if x is divine, x deserves worship by me, for Mormonism countenances the existence of an untold number of 'divine beings' who are not worthy of their worship. Just as it sounds exceedingly odd to say of Baal that he deserves worship though he is not really divine[34], so too it sounds exceedingly odd (to say the least) to claim that Elohim's grandfather or the Mother God are divine but do not deserve our worship. Note that PFW is interestingly analogous to what might be termed the Mormon Principle of the Fidelity of Marriage. According to Mormonism, the ideal marriage is the marriage of one man to at least two women for time and eternity. Here then is the anomaly: Mormons are taught that they ought to marry for eternity but that they ought not remain worshipfully faithful to the Godhead for eternity.

A Mormon apologist might counter by claiming that one's relationship with one's family is fundamentally different from one's worshipful relationship with one's Gods: The former relationship-type lasts forever and the latter does not, and this is a brute revealed fact about one's ideally arranged most intimate relationships. I must admit that I would find this reply to be unintelligible. If one's ideal relationships with one's Gods were essentially marked by infidelity with respect to worship, then I am certain that I have completely failed to understand the meanings of terms like 'Gods', 'ideal' and 'worship' as Mormons are using them in this context.

I shall conclude with what I do understand: (i) It is not possible for there to exist an x such that God properly worships x, (ii) No proper object of worship for S could, so long as both S and that object exist, cease to be a proper object of worship for S, and (iii) for any x such that x is a genuine God, there can exist no beings greater than x. Given the fact that Mormonism teaches that what were once proper objects of worship for S may, at some later time, no longer be, it follows from this fact and (ii) that the Mormon Godhead is not a proper object of worship for S. But it is a necessary truth that any genuine God is a proper object of worship for all creatures (including S) that are, by their very natures, creatures that are capable of worship. This entails that Mormon Gods are not genuine Gods after all.

Of course, it is always open to Mormon apologists to claim that their Gods do in fact worship other Gods in accord with the principle: 'Once a proper object of worship, always a proper object of worship.' But this claim in conjunction with (i) also entails that Mormon Gods are not genuine Gods.[35]

Department of Psychiatry Veterans Administration Medical Center, 2615 E. Clinton Ave. Fresno, California 93703

Notes

1 The first of the LDS Church's thirteen 'Articles of Faith' (originally published in Times and Seasons 1 March 1842, later canonized, and currently found in The Pearl of Great Price) states, 'We believe in God, the Eternal Father, and in His Son, Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Ghost'. In spite of a superficial appearance of traditional Christian monotheistic trinitarianism, this first article of faith is understood by both Christian apologists and Mormons themselves to be expressing an unambiguous commitment to tri-theism.

2 See, for example, Walter R. Martin's The Maze of Mormonism (Santa Ana, CA: Vision House, 1978), especially, Chapter 3: 'The gods of Mormonism: Polytheism returns'; Also see F. J. Beckwith and S. E. Parrish's 'The Mormon God, omniscience, and eternal progression: A philosophical analysis,' Trinity Journal, xii (N.S.) (1991), 127-38, and their The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1991).

3 The remaining three LDS standard works are The Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants, and The Bible (King James Version). All quotations from The Pearl of Great Price (hereafter, PGP) are taken from the 1982 edition published by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah.

4 Joseph Smith's History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. An Introduction and Notes by B. H. Roberts 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Co. 1959) 6: 474.

5 The Journal of Discourses by Brigham Young, President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, His Two Counsellors, the Twelve Apostles, and Others, 26 volumes, reported by G. D. Watt (Liverpool: F. D. Richards, 1854-1886), v. 7, P. 333, hereafter referred to as Journal of Discourses.

6 The contemporary Mormon Church is unambiguous in its denial of the traditional Christian understanding of Christ's Virgin Birth. According to Mormon Church teaching (in contradiction to Matthew 1: 20), the incarnate Christ was conceived not by the Holy Ghost, but by Elohim himself. 'The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints proclaims that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in the most literal sense. The body in which He performed His mission in the flesh was sired by that same Holy Being we worship as God, our Eternal Father. Jesus was not the son of Joseph, nor was He Begotten by the Holy Ghost. He is the Son of the Eternal Father.' Ezra Taft Benson, The Teachings of Ezra Taft Benson (Bookcraft: Salt Lake City, 1988), p. 7.

7 According to one prominent current in orthodox Mormon anthropology (derived, in part, from the PGP's Book of Abraham 3: 18), human spirits pre-exist as eternal, necessarily existent 'intelligences' (although their alleged necessary existence is not entailed by the aforementioned PGP passage). Hence, the traditional Mormon understanding of 'creation' is very unlike the traditional Christian understanding of creation ex nihilo. Mormon deities do not create; rather, they simply organize previously unorganized eternally existent matter. The complex development of Mormon conceptions of 'organization', 'intelligence', 'matter', and 'spirits' is carefully chronicled in Blake T. Ostler's 'The idea of preexistence in Mormon thought', in Line Upon Line: Essays on Mormon Doctrine (ed. G. J. Bergera) (Salt Lake City, Utah: Signature Books, 1989), ch. 12.

8 Journal of Discourses, v. 5, p. 19.

9 An illuminating discussion of this 'shadowy and elusive idea... floating around the edges of Mormon consciousness' (p. 103) can be found in Linda P. Wilcox's 'The Mormon concept of a Mother in heaven', in Bergera (1989), ch. 10.

10 Bruce R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine, 2nd edn. (Salt Lake City, Utah: Bookcraft Inc., 1966) p. 516.

11 McConkie (1966) 577.

12 This characterization of henotheism can be traced to the writings of the 19th century German scholar, Max Mueller. Mueller argued that the religion of ancient Israel was not monotheistic, but rather henotheistic.

13 A discussion of the resources available to certain strands of Mormon neo-orthodoxy for eluding the sorts of metaphysical problems raised in this essay is beyond the scope of this paper. For a clear and provocative introduction to these non-traditional 'neo-orthodox' conceptual possibilities, see O. Kendall White's Mormon Neo-Orthodoxy: A Crisis Theology (Salt Lake City: Signature, 1987).

14 Journal of Discourses, v. 7, p. 333.

15 One must not be misled into thinking that an 'infinite being' understood along Anselmian lines, like an infinite (Cantorian) set, is a being such that there could always be a greater. On the contrary, divine Anselmian properties are great-making in virtue of their maximizability or perfectibility.

16 Whatever Young himself in fact understood by these terms, a commitment to a' finite god' is explicit in contemporary Mormon theology. See, for example, Blake T. Ostler's 'The concept of a finite God as an adequate object of worship', in Bergera (1989), ch. 7.

17 Journal of Discourses, v. 1, p. 93. In contemporary Mormon orthodoxy, it does not appear that there can be a 'greatest intelligence in existence', for the lineage of gods extends infinitely backwards in time.

18 Journal of Discourses, v. 6, p. 120. This understanding of eternal progression is contradicted by Bruce R. McConkie: 'There is no truth he does not know, no wisdom hidden from his view, no laws or powers or facts for him to discover in some distant eternity. His wisdom and knowledge are absolute and have neither bounds nor limitations. He knows all things now; he is not progressing in knowledge; he is not discovering new truths', A New Witness for the Articles of Faith. Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Books, 1985, p. 52.

19 For a dissenting voice from these more recent currents in the Mormon understanding of eternal progression, see Hyrum L. Andrus' Doctrinal Commentary on the Pearl of Great Price (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1967).

20 Van Hale, 'The origin of the human spirit in early Mormon thought', in Bergera (1989), pp. 115 - 26.

21 On this view, human spirits do not exist eternally (much less necessarily). Rather, they are formed from pre-existent material that does exist eternally (and, according to some Mormon thinkers, necessarily).

22 This rejection of all current theistic systems of religion is predicated on Joseph Smith's rejection of all extant systems of religion in the early 19th century as recorded in the PGP. See, for example, 'Joseph Smith - History' 1: 18-19: 'My object in going to inquire of the Lord was to know which of all the sects was right, that I might know which to join. No sooner, therefore, did I get possession of myself, so as to be able to speak, than I asked the Personages who stood above me in the light, which of all the sects was right (for at this time it had never entered into my heart that all are wrong) - and which I should join.

I was answered that I must join none of them, for they were all wrong; and the Personage who addressed me said that all their creeds were an abomination in his sight; that those professors were all corrupt[.]'

23 Brian Leftow, 'Anselmian polytheism', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, XXIII (1988), 77-104, at p. 87.

24 Leftow (1988), 91.

25 Leftow (1988), 91.

26 Leftow (1988), 90.

27 For a defence of the Mormon Gods' worship-worthiness, see Blake T. Ostler, in Bergera (1989).

28 Leftow (1988), 87.

29 Leftow (1988), 88.

30 See, for example, Thomas V. Morris' Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

31 David Yarn, The Gospel: God, Man, and Truth. (Salt Lake City: Deseret, 1979), p. 152.

32 The notion of infidelity with respect to x does not entail that the infidel's commitment to x has been intentionally redirected to a mistress or to an idol. It is sufficient that the infidel simply forsake his commitment to x.

33 Leftow (1988), 86. Leftow adds that 'To count as God, to a Western theist, something must be the source of all things other than itself' (p. 78). Of course, no Mormon God would, on this count alone, be considered to be a genuine God by Western theists' standards.

34 Leftow (1988), 86.

35 I am grateful to Brian Leftow for helpful critical comments on a previous version of this essay.